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because it failed to evaluate his residual functional capacity. Specifically, Prichard
emphasized that no mention is made in the report of any functional capacity evaluation
performed by the panel. The essence of Prichard's argument is that a medical
professional cannot issue work restrictions without conducting a functional capacity
evaluation.2 However, Prichard offers no support for this novel argument. Indeed, based
upon Prichard's argument, the work restrictions issued by Dr. Bova, Dr. Chung, and Dr.
Bender, upon which he relies for his claim to permanent total disability, would also be
disregarded on the basis that those physicians did not perform any functional capacity
evaluations prior to issuing restrictions. The Medical Panel's conclusion with respect to
Prichard's work restrictions was based upon its experience, its examination of Prichard
and a review of all of the medical evidence. The Commission's determination to adopt
such conclusion was reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, Prichard's argument
regarding the necessity for conducting a functional capacity evaluation should be
disregarded.
Additionally, Prichard argues that the Medical Panel's conclusion regarding work
restrictions should be disregarded because there was no conclusion as to whether he could
perform his work functions continuously over an 8 hour work day. However, in the July
28, 2005 addendum Medical Panel Report, Dr. Momberger clarified that the "light to

2

A functional capacity evaluation is usually a series of physical tasks conducted by a
physical therapist over the course of one or two days to assess a person's physical ability to
perform the tasks generally to be applied to a specific job's requirements.
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moderate restriction" from Disability Evaluation is based upon an 8-hour day. Thus,
through the July 28, 2005 addendum, the Medical Panel made it clear that Prichard was
capable of performing "light to moderate" work for an 8-hour day. Accordingly, Prichard
has provided no legal or factual basis for rejection of the Medical Panel's conclusion
regarding his permanent work restrictions. There is no case law, statute or rule that
suggests work restrictions may only be assigned after a functional capacity evaluation is
performed.
Through the Medical Panel Report and the July 28, 2005 addendum, the Medical
Panel made it clear that its conclusion with respect to permanent work restrictions was
made in reliance upon the Department of Labor Guidelines as set forth in Disability
Evaluation, Second Edition, which is published by the American Medical Association.
The Medical Panel's opinion was based upon its examination of Prichard in conjunction
with all of the medical evidence provided by the Labor Commission. The conclusion was
reasonably adopted by the Commission and should not be disturbed.
II.

The Administrative Law Judge Properly Determined that Prichard is Not
Permanently Totally Disabled,
Permanent total disability claims require a four part analysis under U.C.A. § 34A-

2-413(1). The only aspects of the Commission's analysis under attack are its review
under subsections (l)(c), primarily subsection (iv), and (d). However, Prichard has
misquoted subsection (d) and the Commission's analysis under subsection (c) was
appropriate.
11

A.

Evidence of Entitlement to Social Security Disability does not Create a
Presumption of Permanent Total Disability.

Prichard argues that the administrative law judge failed to perform the proper
analysis under Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-10(D) in determining that he is capable of
performing other work reasonably available. Prichard's argument hinges on his
misreading of Section 34A-2-413(l)(d). Prichard alleges that the statute provides that
the:
employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those
provided under this chapter . . . may be presented to the
commission, but is not binding, and creates a [sic]
presumption to entitlement under this chapter...
(Emphasis by Prichard) Petitioner's Brief at 14. However, the statute, now, and at the
time of accident, actually reads as follows:
Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits
other than those provided under this chapter .. ., if relevant,
may be presented to the commission, but is not binding, and
creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter . .

(Emphasis added). Based on Prichard's misquoting the statute, his argument has no
support and should be disregarded.
B.

The ALJ Properly Determined that Prichard is Capable of Performing
Other Work Reasonably Available.

Prichard also argues that the administrative law judge failed to consider and
analyze the acceptable commuting distance and wage requirements pursuant to Rule 6121-10(D). However, the argument focuses primarily on issues with the vocational expert's
12

testimony and issues with the medical panel restrictions, the latter having already been
addressed.
1.

The Evidence Supports a Finding that Other Work was
Reasonably Available when Considering both Wage and
Location Requirements.

In regards to the location and wage of the other work reasonably available, the
record demonstrates that the administrative law judge and the Commission, as the
ultimate finder of fact, considered all of the necessary factors and weighed all of the
evidence including the testimony of vocational expert Dirk Evertsen, in finding that other
work was reasonably available which met the wage and commuting requirements of Rule
612-1-10(D).
During the administrative hearing, vocational expert, Dirk Evertsen, testified that
he had identified 44 jobs in the Utah area and 14 in Florida in the sedentary to light
category which Prichard was capable of performing. Mr. Evertsen identified 14 jobs in
Florida within a 50 mile radius of Prichard's zip code including a loan officer job in the
$40,000 to $60,000 range with no experience necessary and another position in the
$32,000 to $43,000 range.3 The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that the identified job
or jobs must exist "within a reasonable proximity of [the injured worker's] usual
residence or residences." Hoskings v. Industrial Commission. 918 P.2d 150, 158 (Utah
App. 1996). Mr. Evertsen's testimony, which was unrebutted, provided evidence that
3

The State Average Weekly Wage for Prichard's date of injury was $509. Annualized,
this equates to $26,468.
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other work was available within a typical or acceptable commuting distance from either
of Prichard's residences (current or at the time of the accident) and that the available
work provides a gross income greater than the current state average weekly wage.
2.

The Commission Properly Relied on the Evidence, Including the
Medical Panel's Work Restrictions, and Determined That
Prichard Could Perform Other Work Was Reasonably
Available.

In regards to Mr. Prichard's functional capacity, this argument has been addressed
above in responding to Prichard's contentions with the medical panel report. The panel
determined, and the Commission accepted, that Prichard is capable of working in the light
to moderate category. Based on that ability, Mr. Evertsen testified that appropriate jobs
were available. However, in making the argument that he does not have the functional
capacity to work, Prichard disregards the medical panel's opinion that he is capable of
performing light to moderate work. By definition, as noted by the panel, this includes
work up to 35 pounds during an eight hour work day. The panel did not assign any
additional restrictions, such as the need to lie down.
The medical dispute over Prichard's functional capacity, i.e., his restrictions, was
sent to the panel based on differing opinions from Drs. Bender, Bova and Chung
compared to those from Dr. Knorpp. When issues go before a medical panel, the medical
dispute can only be resolved in favor of one party. In this case, the panel's opinion was
favorable to respondents. Therefore, in his argument, Prichard relies on the restrictions
assigned by Dr. Bender only, namely no lifting over 10 pounds and the need to lie down.
14

Dr. Benders' restrictions do not, however, dictate the functional capacity in this case - the
panel's do. Therefore, Prichard's reliance on Dr. Bender's restrictions is misplaced.
Because of the difference in restrictions from the various doctors at the time of the
hearing, Mr. Evertsen had to address various possibilities from moderate to sedentary
work, with the understanding that if one can work in a certain category, one can always
work in a category that is more restrictive, e.g., if one can perform light work, one can
also perform sedentary work. In doing so, he testified that Prichard would be capable of
performing work in the sedentary to light category, specifically identifying jobs with
lifting requirements between 20-25 pounds. (Record Vol. 2 at 46-25 to 47-5).
Based on Mr. Evertsen's testimony that jobs were available to Prichard with lifting
of less than 25 pounds, and the medical panel's determination of a 35 pound lifting
capability, the Commission properly determined that Prichard had the residual function to
perform other work reasonably available.
In short, and as noted above, the administrative law judge, and subsequently the
Commission, specifically referenced the definition of "other work reasonably available"
under Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-10(D). The administrative law judge further set
forth facts addressing the criteria found in Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv): (1) Prichard has
the ability to lift up to 35 pounds occasionally and 18 pounds frequently as determined by
the Medical Panel (medical and residual functional capacity); (2) Prichard possesses a
bachelor's degree in business management (education); (3) Prichard has the ability to sit,
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stand, and walk alternately, and was able to sit through both the hearing and the
deposition (residual functional capacity); (4) Prichard worked in management for K-Mart
supervising 80-90 employees and running a large retail store (past work experience); (5)
prior to working for K-Mart, Prichard was in the military and trained as an administrative
specialist, running an academic library and maintaining classroom materials, and as a
heavy equipment operator (past work experience); (6) Prichard has a high level of
education and a significant management background (education and past work
experience); (7) the medical panel and vocational expert, Dirk Evertsen, both concluded
that the most significant obstacle to Prichard's return to work was his perception of
himself as disabled (panel addressed medical and residual functional capacity, and the
vocational expert applied those to age, education and past work experience). (Record
Vol. 1 at 108). The Commission subsequently found that Prichard, at the time of the
Order, was 48 years old. (Record Vol. 1 at 145). Again, these facts establish the criteria
set forth in Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv), namely age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity and residual functional capacity.
Based upon the foregoing factors, the administrative law judge concluded, and the
Commission upheld, that Prichard "has significant education and experience in
management to find other employment in business management, human resources and
customer service." (Record Vol. 1 at 108). Additionally, the administrative law judge
concluded that "Mr. Evertsen identified employment which meets [Prichard's] objective

16

physical capacity and is reasonably available to him based upon his current skills and
education level." (Record Vol. 1 at 108). As outlined above, the evidence obtained from
Mr. Evertsen included jobs within a reasonable commuting distance and at wages higher
than the current average weekly wage. Based upon the evidence that such jobs existed
and were available, the administrative law judge properly concluded that other work was
reasonably available to Prichard in accordance with the definition set forth in Utah
Administrative Rule 612-1-10(D).
CONCLUSION
The Medical Panel assigned proper work restrictions to Prichard that fell within
the light to moderate work categories. The ALJ and Commission properly relied on these
restrictions and, in combination with the vocational expert's opinion, concluded that
Prichard could perform other work reasonably available. Thus, the Commission's
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Entitlement to Social Security Disability
does not create a presumption of entitlement to permanent total disability benefits.
Therefore, the Commission's decision should be upheld.
DATED this 2 >

day of

/t/ltiL

, 2009.

RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

y^AARK R<^lM§ION
Attorneys for Petitioners
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Addendum A
Statutes and Rules
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maximum of 66-V3% of the state average weekly wage a t the
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
required to be paid.
1997
34A-2-413. P e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y — A m o u n t of
payments — Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from
an industrial accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee h a s t h e burden of proof to
show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(1) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the
industrial accident or occupational disease t h a t gives
rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled;
and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease
was the direct cause of the employee's permanent
total disability.
(c) l b find an employee permanently totally disabled,
the commission shall conclude that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments t h a t limit the employee's ability
to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent t h e
employee from performing the essential functions of
the work activities for which the employee h a s been
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or
occupational disease t h a t is the basis for t h e employee's permanent total disability claim; a n d
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration t h e employee's age, education, p a s t work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of a n employee's entitlement to disability
benefits other than those provided under this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant,
may be presented to t h e commission, but is not binding
and creates no presumption of a n entitlement under this
chapter and Chapter 3, U t a h Occupational Disease Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the
initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-%% of
tbe employee's average weekly wage a t the time of the injury,
United as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more t h a n 85%
of the state average weekly wage a t the t i m e of the injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less t h a n t h e
sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus
$5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of t h e employee a t
the time of the injury; a n d
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly
compensation rate u n d e r Subsection (2Kb) shall be 36% of
the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the
nearest dollar.
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
°ut of and in the course of t h e employee's employment on or
Wore J u n e 30, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for
the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in
effect on the date of injury.

34A-2-413

(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be
required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks a t the
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate
under Subsection (2)
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of t h e
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from;
the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the]
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at
the applicable permanent total disability compensation
rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all
remaining permanent total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance
carrier h a s satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or
Section 34A-2-703.
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or
after July 1, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for
permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be
required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the
applicable permanent total disability compensation r a t e
under Subsection (2)
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future
liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after
an employee h a s received compensation from the employer or
the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation a t the
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced,
to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of
the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during t h e same period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total
disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the
parties, until:
(i) a n administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursua n t to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance e a r n e r submits
to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan
as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider
reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance
carrier provides the administrative law judge notice
t h a t t h e employer or its insurance carrier will not
submit a plan, and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to
t h e parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by

34A-2-413
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the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's
subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or
medical benefits due the employee.
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given
credit for any disability payments made under Subsection
(6Xb) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act.
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be
ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer
or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the
plan is subject to Subsections (6Xd)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education,
medical and disability compensation benefits, job
placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its
insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable
disability compensation to provide for the employee's
subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently
pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the
administrative law judge On the administrative law
judge's own motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the
employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the
facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capahle of returning to
regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or
locate for a permanently totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job
earning at least minimum wage provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability
benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement
and employment process and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part time work.
(d) I n a consecutive four-week period when an employee^ gross income from the work provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability
compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess
of $500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate,
part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained
in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding
the part-time work and offset.
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under
Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication.

3!f

(g) The emploj'er or its insurance carrier shall have tfig
burden of proof to show that medically appropriate par§
time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any jog
that would reqiure the employee to undertake work
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual
functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as provided in
Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate
part-time employment has been offered but the employee
has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent
partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an
employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the
administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully
cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific
findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use
of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes,
or any combination of two such body members constitutes
total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to
Subsection (10Xa) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or
self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility
to determine whether the worker remains permanently
totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than
once every three years after an award is final, unless good
cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to
allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexanrination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical
evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax
Returns;
(v) employee certification pf compliance with Section 34A-2-1L0; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or
questionnaires approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for
the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel
allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert
witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at
the time of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability benefits
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total
disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably
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raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlem e n t to permanent total disability compensation
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer m a y
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing
on t h a t issue. The petition shall be accompanied by
documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief t h a t the employee is no longer
permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (ll)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall
adjudicate t h e issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in
medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the
sole basis for termination of an employee's p e r m a n e n t
total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the
employee's participation in medically appropriate,
part-time work under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing with other
evidence relating to the employee's status and condition,
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees
to a n attorney retained by an employee to represent the
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000.
The attorneys fees shall be paid by t h e employer or its
insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total
disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication
if t h e employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability compensation
benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
1997
34A-2-414. B e n e f i t s in c a s e of d e a t h — D i s t r i b u t i o n of
a w a r d to d e p e n d e n t s — D e a t h of d e p e n d e n t s
— R e m a r r i a g e of s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e .
(1) (a) The benefits in case of death shall be paid to one or
more of t h e dependents of the decedent for t h e benefit of
all t h e dependents, as m a y be determined by an administrative law judge.
(b) The administrative law judge may apportion t h e
benefits among the dependents in the m a n n e r t h a t the
administrative law judge considers j u s t and equitable.
(c) Payment to a dependent subsequent in right m a y be
made, if t h e administrative law judge considers it proper,
and shall operate to discharge all other claims.
(2) The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are paid,
shall apply t h e same to the use of the several beneficiaries
thereof in compliance with the finding a n d direction of t h e
administrative law judge.
(3) In all cases of death when:
(a) the dependents are a surviving spouse and one or
more minor children, jt shall be sufficient for the surviving spouse to make application to the Division of Adjudication on behalf of t h a t individual and t h e minor children;
and
(b) all of the dependents are minors, the application
shall be m a d e by the guardian or next friend of t h e minor
dependents.
(4) The administrative law judge may, for the purpose of
Protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependents
°te administrative law judge considers incapable of doing so,

34A-2-417

provide a method of safeguarding any payments due the minor
dependents.
(5) Should any dependent of a deceased employee die during the period covered by weekly payments authorized by this
section, the right of the deceased dependent to compensation
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act, shall cease.
(6) (a) If a surviving spouse, who is a dependent of a
deceased employee and who is receiving the benefits of
this chapter or Chapter 3 remarries, t h a t individual's sole
right after the remarriage to further payments of compensation shall be the right to receive in a lump sum the
lesser of:
(i) the balance of the weekly compensation payments unpaid from t h e time of remarriage to the end
of six years or 312 weeks from the date of t h e injury
from which death resulted; or
(ii) a n amount equal to 52 weeks of compensation
at the weekly compensation rate the surviving spouse
was receiving a t the time of such remarriage,
(b) (i) If there a r e other dependents remaining a t the
time of remarriage, benefits payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, U t a h Occupational Disease Act,
shall be paid to such person as an administrative law
judge may determine, for the use and benefit of the
other dependents.
(ii) The weekly benefits to be paid under Subsection (6Xb)(i) shall be paid a t intervals of not less than
four weeks.
1997
34A-2-415. Increase of a w a r d to c h i l d r e n a n d d e p e n d e n t s p o u s e — Effect of death, marriage, majority, or t e r m i n a t i o n of d e p e n d e n c y of child r e n — D e a t h , divorce, or r e m a r r i a g e of
spouse.
If an award is made to, or increased because of a dependent
spouse or dependent minor child or children, as provided in
this chapter or Chapter 3, U t a h Occupational Disease Act, the
award or increase in amount of the a w a r d shall cease at:
(1) the death, marriage, attainment of the age of 18
years, or termination of dependency of the minor child or
children; or
(2) upon the death, divorce, or remarriage of t h e spouse
of t h e employee, subject to t h e provisions in Section
34A-2-414 relative to the remarriage of a spouse.
1998
34A-2-416. Additional benefits i n s p e c i a l c a s e s ,
(1) An administrative law judge may extend indefinitely
benefits received by a wholly dependent person under this
chapter or Chapter 3, U t a h Occupational Disease Act, if at the
termination of the benefits:
(a) the wholly dependent person is still in a dependent
condition; and
(b) under all reasonable circumstances the wholly dependent person should be entitled to additional benefits.
(2) If benefits are extended under Subsection (1):
(a) the liability of the employer or insurance carrier
involved may not be extended; and
(b) the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund created in Subsection
34A-2-702U).
1997
34A-2-417. Claims a n d benefits — T i m e limits for filing
— B u r d e n of proof.
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonperman e n t total disability cases a n employee's medical benefit
entitlement ceases if for a period of three consecutive years the
employee does not:
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the
industrial accident; and

discovered information may be allowed.
R612-1-8* Insurance Carrier/Employer Liability•
A. This rule governs responsibility for payment of workers'
compensation benefits for industrial accidents when:
1. The worker's ultimate entitlement to benefits is not in
dispute; but
2. There is a dispute between self-insured employers and/or
insurers regarding their respective liability for the injured worker' s
benefits arising out of separate industrial accidents which are
compensable under Utah law.
B.
In cases meeting the criteria of subsection A, the
self-insured employer or insurer providing workers' compensation
coverage for the most recent compensable injury shall advance workers 1
compensation benefits to the injured worker. The benefits advanced
shall be limited to medical benefits and temporary total disability
compensation. The benefits advanced shall be paid according to the
entitlement in effect on the date of the earliest related injury.
1. The self-insured employer or insurance carrier advancing
benefits shall notify the non-advancing party(s) within the time
periods as specified in rule R612-1-7, that benefits are to be advanced
pursuant to this rule.
2.
The self-insured employers or insurers not advancing
benefits, upon notification from the advancing party, shall notify
the advancing party within 10 working days of any potential defenses
or limitations of the non-advancing party(s) liability.
C. The parties are encouraged to settle liabilities pursuant
to this rule, however, any party may file a request for agency action
with the Commission for determination of liability for the workers'
compensation benefits at issue.
D.
The medical utilization decisions of the self-insured
employer or insurer advancing benefits pursuant to this rule shall
be presumed reasonable with respect to the issue of reimbursement.
R612-1-9* Compensation Agreements.
A. An applicant, insurance company, and/or employer may enter
into a compensation agreement for the purpose* of resolving a worker's
compensation claim. Compensation agreements must be approved by the
Commission. The compensation agreement must be that contained on
Form 019 of the Commission forms and shall include the following
information:
1. Signatures of the parties involved;
2. Form 122 - Employer's First Report of Injury;
3. Doctor's report of impairment rating;
4. Form 141 - Payment of Benefits Statement.
B. Failure to provide any of the above documentation and forms
may result in the return of the compensation agreement to the carrier
or self-insured employer without approval.
R612-1-10. Permanent Total Disability,
A. This rule applies to claims for permanent total disability
compensation under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
1. Subsection B applies to permanent total disability claims

arising from accident or disease prior to May 1, 1995.
2. Subsection C applies to permanent total disability claims
arising from accident or disease on or after May 1, 1995,
B. For claims arising from accident or disease on or after July
1, 1988 and prior to May 1, 1995, the Commission is required under
Section 34A-2-413, to make a finding of total disability as measured
by the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the
Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, amended April 1, 1993. The use of the term "substance
of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in
making its findings relative to permanent total disability. The
Commission does not interpret the code section to eliminate the
requirement that a finding by the Commission in permanent and total
disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until
rehabilitation training and/or evaluation has been accomplished.
1. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its
designee has made, or is in the process of making, a determination
of disability under the foregoing process, the Commission may use
this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf.
2. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker
has qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission
will determine if a significant cause of the disability is the
claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or
causes.
3. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability
the Commission incorporates the rules of disability determination
in 20 CFR 404.1520, amended April 1, 1993. The sequential decision
making process referred to requires a series of questions and
evaluations to be made in sequence. In short, these are:
a. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
b. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
c.
Does the severe impairment meet or equal the duration
requirement in 20 CFR 404.1509, amended April 1, 1993, and the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Subpart P Appendix 1, amended April 1, 1993?
d. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work?
e. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing any other
work?
4. After the Commission has made a tentative finding of permanent
total disability:
a. In those cases arising after July 1,1994, the Commission
shall order initiation of payment of permanent total disability
compensation;
b.
the Commission shall review a summary of reemployment
activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment
Act, as well as any qualified reemployment plan submitted by the
employer or its insurance carrier; and
c. unless otherwise stipulated, the Commission shall hold a
hearing to consider the possibility of rehabilitation and reemployment
of the claimant pending final adjudication of the claim.
5. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties,
the Commission shall issue an order finding or denying permanent total

disability based upon the preponderance of the evidence and with due
consideration of the vocational factors in combination with the
residual functional capacity which the commission incorporates as
published in 20 CFR 404 Subpart P Appendix 2, amended April 1, 1993.
C. For permanent total disability claims arising on or after
May 1, 1995, Section 34A-2-413 requires a two-step adjudicative
process. First, the Commission must make a preliminary determination
whether the applicant 'is permanently and totally disabled. If so,
the Commission will proceed to the second step, in which the Commission
will determine whether the applicant can be reemployed or
rehabi1i tated.
1. First Step - Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total
Disability: On receipt of an application for permanent total
disability compensation, the Adjudication Division will assign an
Administrative Law Judge to conduct evidentiary proceedings to
determine whether the applicant's circumstances meet each of the
elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(1) (b) and (c) .
(a) If the ALJ finds the applicant meets each of the elements
set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413 (1) (b) and (c) , the ALJ will issue
a preliminary determination of permanent total disability and shall
order the employer or insurance carrier to pay permanent total
disability compensation to the applicant pending completion of the
second step of the adjudication process. The payment of permanent
total disability compensation pursuant to a preliminary determination
shall commence as of the date established by the preliminary
determination and shall continue until otherwise ordered.
(b)
A party dissatisfied with the ALJ's preliminary
determination may obtain additional agency review by either the Labor
Commissioner or Appeals Board pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-801(3).
If a timely motion for review of the ALJ's preliminary determination
is filed with either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board, no
further adjudicative or enforcement proceedings shall take place
pending the decision of the Commissioner or Board.
(c) A preliminary determination of permanent total disability
by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board is a final agency action
for purposes of appellate judicial review.
(d) Unless otherwise stayed by the Labor Commissioner, the
Appeals Board or an appellate court, an appeal of the Labor
Commissioner or Appeals Board's preliminary determination of
permanent total disability shall not delay the commencement of "second
step" proceedings discussed below or payment of permanent total
disability compensation as ordered by the preliminary determination.
(e) The Commissioner or Appeals Board shall grant a request
for stay if the requesting party has filed a petition for judicial
review and the Commissioner or Appeals Board determine that:
(i)
the requesting party has a substantial possibility of
prevailing on the merits;
(ii) the requesting party will suffer irreparable injury unless
a stay is granted; and
(iii) the stay will not result in irreparable injury to other
parties to the proceeding.
2. Second Step - Reemployment and Rehabilitation: Pursuant to
Subsection 34A-2-413 (6) , if the first step of the adjudicatory process

results in a preliminary finding of permanent total disability, an
additional inquiry must be made into the applicant's ability to be
reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive such additional
proceedings.
(a) The ALJ will hold a hearing to consider whether the applicant
can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
(i) As part of the hearing, the ALJ will review a summary of
reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured Worker
Reemployment Act;
(ii) The employer or insurance carrier may submit a reemployment
plan
meeting
the
requirements
set
forth
in
Subsection
34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii) and Subsections 34A-2-413(6)(d)(i) through
(iii) •
(b) Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-413 (4) (b) the employer or
insurance carrier may not be required to pay disability compensation
for any combination of disabilities of any kind in excess of the amount
of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable
permanent total disability compensation rate.
(i) Any overpayment of disability compensation may be recouped
by the employer or insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the
overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial
312 weeks.
(ii) An advance of disability compensation to provide for the
employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process is subject
to the provisions of Subsection 34A-2-413 (4) (b) , described in
subsection 2.(b) above, but can be funded by reasonably offsetting
the advance of disability compensation against future liability
normally paid after the initial 312 weeks.
(iii) To fund an advance of disability compensation to provide
for an employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process, a
portion of the stream of future weekly disability compensation
payments may be discounted from the future to the present to
accommodate payment.
Should this be necessary, the employer or
insurance carrier shall be allowed to reasonably offset the amounts
paid against future liability payable after the initial 312 weeks.
In this process, care should be exercised to reasonably minimize
adverse financial impact on the employee.
(iv)
In the event the parties cannot agree as to the
reasonableness of any proposed offset, the matter may be submitted
to an ALJ for determination.
(c) Subsections 34A-2-413(7) and (9) require the applicant to
fully cooperate in any evaluation or reemployment plan. Failure to
do so shall result in dismissal of the applicant's claim or reduction
or elimination of benefit payments including disability compensation
and subsistence allowance amounts, consistent with the provisions
of Section 34A-2-413(7) and (9).
(d)
Subsection 34A-2-413(6) requires the employer or its
insurance carrier to diligently pursue any proffered reemployment
plan. Failure to do so shall result in a final award of permanent
total disability compensation to the applicant.
(e) If, after the conclusion of the foregoing "second step"
proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the ALJ shall enter a final order for continuing payment

of permanent total disability compensation. The period for payment
of such compensation shall be commence on the date the employee became
permanently and totally disabled, as determined by the ALJ.
(f) Alternatively, if after the conclusion of the "second step"
proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful rehabilitation and/or
reemployment is possible, the ALJ shall enter a final order to that
effect, which order shall contain such direction to the parties as
the ALJ shall deem appropriate for successful implementation and
continuation of rehabilitation and/or reemployment. As necessary
under the particular circumstances of each case, the ALJ's final order
shall provide for reasonable offset of payments of any disability
compensation that constitute an overpayment under Subsection
34A-2-413(4)(b).
(g) The ALJ's decision is subject to all administrative and
judicial review provided by law.
D.
For purposes of this rule, the following standards and
definitions apply:
1.
Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical
restrictions and other provisions of the Act and rules, other work
is reasonably available to a claimant if such work meets the following
criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of
the claimant's community would consider to be a typical or acceptable
commuting distance, or is within the distance the claimant was
traveling to work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
c. The* work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of
the accident the claimant was earning more than the state average
weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident,
if the employee was earning less than the state average weekly wage
then in effect.
2. Cooperation: As determined by an administrative law judge,
an employee is not entitled to permanent total disability compensation
or subsistence benefits unless the employee fully cooperates with
any evaluation or reemployment plan. The ALJ will evaluate the
cooperation of the employee using, but not limited to, the following
factors: attendance, active participation, effort, communication with
the plan coordinator, and compliance with the requirements of the
vocational plan. In determining if these factors were met, the ALJ
shall consider relevant changes in the employee's documents medical
condition.
3 . Diligent Pursuit: The employer or its insurance carrier shall
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The ALJ will evaluate the
employer or insurance carrier's diligent pursuit of the plan using,
but not limited to, the following factors: timely payment of expenses
and benefits outline in the vocational plan, and as required by the
educational
institution
providing
the
vocational
training,
communication with the employee, compliance with the requirements
of the vocational plan, and timely modification of the plan as required
by documented changes in the employee's medical condition.
4. Resolution of disputes regarding "cooperation" and "diligent

pursuit": If a party believes another party is not cooperating with
or diligently pursing either the evaluations necessary to establish
a plan, or the requirements of an approved reemployment or
rehabilitation plan, the aggrieved party shall submit to the workers 1
compensation mediation unit an outline of the specific instances of
non-cooperation or lack of diligence. Other parties may submit a
reply.
The Mediation Unit will promptly schedule mediation to
reestablish cooperation among the parties necessary to evaluate or
comply with the plan. If mediation is unsuccessful, a party may request
the Adjudication Division resolve the dispute.
The Adjudication
Division will conduct a hearing on the matter within 30 days and shall
issue a written decision with 10 days thereafter.
R612-1-11. Burial Expenses,
(1)
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-418 if death results from an
industrial injury or occupational disease, burial expenses in ordinary
cases shall be paid by the employer or insurance carrier up to $8,000.
Unusual cases may result in additional payment, either voluntarily
by the employer or insurance carrier or through commission order.
(2) Beginning in the year 2004 and every two years thereafter,
the Commission shall review this rule and shall make such adjustments
as are necessary so that the burial expense provided by this rule
remains equitable when compared to the average cost of burial in this
state.
KEY: workers' compensation,, time, administrative procedures, filing
deadlines
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: July 2, 2005
Notice of Continuation: August 15, 2007
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law: 34A-2-101 et seq.;
34A-3-101 et seq,; 34A-1-104 et seq.; 63-46b-l et seq.

Addendum B
"Order Affirming ALJ's Decision" dated October 31,2007

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

RICHARD D. PRICHARD,

\

Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

K-MART,

Case No. 03-0493

Respondent.

Richard D. Prichard asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
Marlowe's denial of Mr. Prichard's claim for permanent total disability benefits under the Utah
Workers* Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 a n d § 34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On June 7,2000, Mr. Prichard injured his back while working for K-Mart. K-Mart accepted
liability for the injury under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and paid Mr. Prichard's medical
expenses, temporary disability compensation and permanent partial disability compensation. On
May 6, 2003, Mr. Prichard filed an application with the Commission to compel K-Mart to also pay
permanent total disability compensation.
Judge Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Prichard's claim and then appointed an
impartial medical panel to consider the medical aspects of the claim. After receiving the panel's
initial and supplemental reports, Judge Marlowe accepted the panel's findings and, relying on those
findings and other evidence of record, concluded that Mr. Prichard's circumstances did not meet the
Act's standards for a preliminary determination of permanent total disability.
In challenging Judge Marlowe's decision, Mr. Prichard argues that: i) the medical panel did
not properly evaluate Mr. Prichard's residual functional capacity; and 2) Judge Marlowe did not
properly analyze Mr. Prichard's claim according to the requirements of § 34A-2-413(l) of the Act
and associated Commission rules.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts Judge Marlowe's findings of fact, as supplemented by the additional
findings included in this decision and summarized as follows.
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Mr. Prichard is 48 years old and currently lives in Florida. He has a bachelor's degree in
business management as well as retail sales management experience. He also has military
experience and training as an administrative specialist and librarian. At the time of the accident
which gives rise to this claim for permanent total disability compensation, K-Mart employed Mr.
Prichard as a manager.
On June 7, 2000, Mr. Prichard was involved in a lifting accident at K-Mart. As a result of
this accident, he suffered a herniated disc at the L4-5 level of his spine. He underwent surgery on
August 21,2000, and experienced some temporary improvement. However, the pain in his back and
legs returned. Since then, Mr. Prichard has received pain medication, physical therapy, steroid
injections and pain management training.
Mr. Prichard's back injury left him with a permanent 10% whole person impairment. He
cannot: I) lift and carry more than 35 pounds; 2) lift and carry more than 18 pounds "frequently"; or
3) lift and carry more than 9 pounds "constantly". He is also restricted from bending, stooping,
squatting and climbing, and must be able to occasionally move from standing to sitting positions.
The Social Security Administration has found Mr. Prichard totally disabled and entitled to social
security total disability benefits.
Despite the physical problems and limitations that stem from Mr. Prichard's work-related
injury, his age, education, past work experience^^and remaining medical and functional capacity
qualify him to perform other work that is reasonably available to him, both in Florida and in Utah.
Specifically, there are substantial numbers of available jobs in sales, retail and finance that are within
Mr. Prichard's physical abilities, and for which he is qualified by education, experience and training.
These positions appear to be relatively well-paying, with at least some offering annual salaries of
approximately $40,000.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION O F LAW
As already noted, Mr. Prichard challenges Judge Marlowe's decision on two grounds. First,
he challenges the adequacy of the medical panel's evaluation. Next, he contends that Judge Marlowe
did not properly evaluate his claim under the governing provisions of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act. These arguments are addressed below.
Adequacy of medical panel evaluation. Mr. Prichard argues that the medical panel's opinion
regarding his physical abilities is not supported by any functional capacity testing. Mr. Prichard also
argues that the panel did not explain the basis for its opinion. In considering these points, the
Commission notes that the medical panel consisted of three respected experts in the fields of
orthopedics, neurology and psychiatry. These panelists reviewed Mr. Prichard's entire medical
history, including the reports and opinions of Mr. Prichard's own treating physicians. Finally, the
panelists personally examined Mr. Prichard. Based on all this information, and after consulting
appropriate professional guidelines for the evaluation of disability, the panel concluded that Mr.
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Prichard's abilities placed him in a "light-to-medium" classification, with the lifting restrictions set
forth in this decision's findings of fact. In light of the medical panel's expertise and its thorough
review of Mr. Prichard's case, the Commission finds the panel's opinion to be well-supported and
adequately explained.
The Commission also notes Mr. Prichard's argument that Judge Marlowe was obligated to
hold a hearing to consider the parties' objections to the panel's report However, § 34A-260 l(2)(f)(i) of the Act permits but does not require an ALJ to hold a hearing on such objections. In
other words, the statute grants the ALJ discretion to determine whether a medical panel hearing is
necessary. The Commission agrees with Judge Marlowe's judgment that no such hearing was
required in this case.
Application of Act to Mr. Prichard's claim. Mr. Prichard seeks a preliminary determination
by the Commission that he is permanently and totally disabled. Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act is the governing statute and provides as follows:
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude
that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the
employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial . . . impairments prevent the employee from performing the
essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified
until the time of the industrial accident. . . ; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity;
(E) residual functional capacity.
Judge Marlowe determined that, although Mr. Prichard met the requirements of § 413(l)(c)(i)
through (iii), he did not satisfy § 4l3(l)(c)(iv)'s requirement that he be unable to "perform other
work reasonably." Mr. Prichard now argues that Judge Marlowe failed to apply the analysis required
by § 413(l)(c)(iv) and the Commission's Rule R612-1-10.D.
Rule 612-1-I0.D.1 identifies the subsidiary facts that will be considered in determining
whether "other work is reasonably available" to an injured worker, as follows:
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1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant if
such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimants community
would consider to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is within the
distance the claimant was traveling to work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the claimant
was earning more than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, if the employee
was earning less than the state average weekly wage then in effect.
The Commission agrees with Mr. Prichard's assertion that Judge Marlowe's decision does
not idfentify or evaluate the "other work" that may be available for Mr. Prichard. The Commission
has therefore addressed that issue by including additional findings of fact in this decisiop. As noted
in those supplemental findings, the evidentiary record establishes that work is available to Mr.
Prichard that is within his medical and functional abilities, is reasonably close to his current
residence and his former work location in Utah, and pays a sufficient wage. This work is also
consistent with Mr. Prichard's education, training and experience. With these additional facts, the
Commission concurs with Judge Marlowe's ultimate determination that Mr. Prichard has not met his
burden of proving that he cannot perform other work reasonably available to him, as required by §
34A-2-4l3(l)(c)(iv). Consequently, Mr. Prichard is not entitled to a preliminary finding of
permanent total disability,
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Marlowe's decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this 31

day of October, 2007.

•

"i ~ i L _

Sherrie Hayashi
Utah Labor Commissioner
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Richard
D. Prichard, Case No. 03-0493, was mailed first class postage prepaid t h i s j y c l a y of October,
2007, to the following:
Richard D. Prichard
1348 Amesbury Court
NPtRichyFL 34655
KMart
4670 S 900 E
Murray UT 84107
David K. Smith, Esq.
6925 Union Park Center Ste 600
Midvale UT 84047
Mark Sumsion, Esq.
299SMainStStel500
P O Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 84110

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order" dated October 17, 2005

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
POBox 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

RICHARD D PRICHARD,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 2003493

KMART,
Respondent

Judge Deidre Marlowe

HEARING:

January 20, 2004.

BEFORE:

Deidre Marlowe, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Richard D. Prichard was represented by David K. Smith
Kmart, was represented by attorney Mark Sumsion

Richard D. Prichard filed an application for hearing on May 6, 2003 alleging an injury
date of June 7, 2000 and requesting permanent total compensation. The Respondents filed an
answer on June 3, 2003 admitting that Petitioner suffered an injury in the course and scope of his
employment as alleged, for which they have paid various benefits, but defending on the grounds
that Petitioner is not permanently and totally disabled. The parties stipulated that all appropriate
benefits have been paid up through July 25, 2002.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued on March 5, 2005 referring the
medical aspects of this case to a Commission medical panel. The panel issued its report on June
8, 2005 and it was forwarded to the parties via certified mail on June 9, 2005. The petitioner
filed a timely objection to the panel's report. The undersigned requested clarification of the
panel's report which was issued on August 15, 2005 and mailed to the parties via certified mail
on September 20, 2005. The petitioner filed a timely objection to the panel's report.
OBJECTIONS TO THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT
Utah Code § 34A-2-601 contains the procedures for Labor Commission medical panelsSection 34A-2-60l(2)(d)(i) requires the ALJ to "promptly distribute full copies of the report...by
certified mail. . .." Section 34A-2-601(2)(ii) and (iii) outline the objection process and state:
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in Subsection
(2)(d)(i) is deposited in the United States post office, the following
may file with the administrative law judge written objections to the

and administered steroid injections, which gave some relief. He also gave the Petitioner a V-lok
brace. ME p. 64.
Petitioner was evaluated by Scot Russell, Ph.D. June 27,2001, who gave the green light
on the Petitioner's admission to a pain management program.
Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Jeff Chung on August 29, 2001, who acknowledged his
condition of failed back syndrome, and who indicates that Petitioner did not show the appearance
of malingering, hysteria, conversion reaction or symptom magnification. ME p. 153. Dr. Chung
concludes that Petitioner has less than a 1% chance of having improvement in his symptoms to
the point of being able to find work in the competitive job market or weaning himself from
narcotics. ME p. 154. Dr. Chung believes a fusion surgery would only worsen the condition.
Dr. Chung rates the Petitioner with a 13% whole person impairment, which includes
consideration of both the back and leg radiculopathy. ME p. 155.
On January 17, 2002 Dr. Bova's restrictions were limited sitting, standing, bending
stooping, twisting and that he was not capable of working full time in a primarily seated position
with the option to stand if needed, in short, "pt is totally disabled." ME p. 75.
On November 26, 2002 Dr. Scott Knorpp evaluated the Petitioner and concluded that
Petitioner suffered failed back syndrome with symptom magnification syndrome. Dr. Knorrp
indicates that Petitioner is not getting any true benefits from his pain medications, and
furthermore that continued injections are not medically reasonable. Fusion surgery is
recommended against. In a subsequent report, Dr. Knorpp notes Petitioner's unwillingness to
put forth a valid effort during his functional capacity evaluation, and because of that there is no
sound medical foundation to introduce permanent physician imposed restrictions with regard to
work. ME p. 198. Dr. Knorpp opines that there is no medical reason that the Petitioner cannot
return to work.
Petitioner was independently evaluated by Dr. John Barbuto on December 12, 2002. Dr.
Barbuto notes the Petitioner has clear disc herniation, but also notes "obviously excessive pain
melodrama" from the Petitioner prior to and during the exam. Dr. Barbuto thinks the condition
is social posturing rather than a logical biological conclusion and diagnoses a biopsychosocial
pain syndrome. ME p. 204, 209. Also a 10% impairment rating is assessed. ME p. 211.
The Petitioner began seeing Dr. Daniel Bender in October 2003. Dr. Bender diagnosed
chronic low back pain and secondary depression, and prescribed ongoing Oxycontin and other
drugs. ME p. 221. He also administered nerve blocks. On December 21, 2003 Dr. Bender's
restrictions were given as: no lifting more than 10 pounds, no standing more than 30 minutes, no
sitting more than 30 minutes, no bending, stooping, squatting, and the need to lie down
frequently. ME p. 231. The January 24, 2004 restriction form indicates "unable to work." ME
p. 230.
Petitioner received a Social Security disability finding with payments beginning August
21, 2000 for his lumbar spine injury and back problems. He currently takes 40 mg. Oxycontin 3
times a day, Neurontin, Percocet for breakthrough pain, Tisdone, and Lexapril, an antidepressant.
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The petitioner is unable to perform his former work as retail store manager as the result
of the work related injury. The petitioner's job as a store manager required him to assist in
unloading trucks and lift items of stock, and to walk, stand, lift and carry beyond his current
physical restrictions.
The petitioner can perform other work reasonably available. The petitioner is now 46
years old and he possesses a bachelor's degree in business management. The petitioner has the
ability to sit, stand and walk alternately and was able to sit through both the hearing and the
deposition. The petitioner has the ability to lift up to 35 pounds occasionally and 18 pounds
frequently. The petitioner worked in management for Kmart supervising 80-90 employees and
running a large retail store. Prior to working for Kmart, the petitioner was in the military and
trained as an administrative specialist, running an academic library and maintaining classroom
materials, and as a heavy equipment operator. The petitioner possesses a high level of education
and a significant management background. The petitioner has not attempted to seek other
employment and both the medical panel and Dirk Evertson noted that the most significant
obstacle to the petitioner's return to employment was his perception of himself as disabled. The
petitioner's medical restrictions do not prevent him from working in a light category of
employment and he has significant education and experience in management to find other
employment in business management, human resources and customer service. Mr. Evertson
identified employment which meets the petitioner's objective physical capacity and is reasonably
available to him based upon his current skills and education level.
The petitioner is not permanently totally disabled as the result of his industrial injury.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 provides that only those injuries arising out of and in the
course of employment are compensable under the Workers Compensation Act. Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986), held the statute [current section 34A-2401] "...creates two prerequisites for a finding of a compensable injury. First, the injury must be
'by accident.' Second, the language 'arising out of or in the course of employment' requires that
there be a causal connection between the injury and the employment."
For an injury to be compensable under the Act, a petitioner must show by evidence,
opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the
resulting injury or disability and in the event a petitioner cannot show a medical causal
connection, compensation should be denied. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986).
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 states in relevant part:
(I) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident
or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as
outlined in this section,
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence
that:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The petitioner suffered a compensable industrial injury on June 7, 2000 while employed
by the respondent, KMart
The petitioner is not permanently totally disabled as the result of the June 7,2000
industrial injury.
The petitioner's application for hearing is dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED the petitioner's application for hearing is dismissed with
prejudice.
DATED October _^_, 2005.

Deidre Marlowe
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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